

ASPECTS OF THE THEORY ON ‘IDEAS’, ‘EIDE’ AND ‘LOGOI’ OF BEINGS IN GEORGE PACHYMERES

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ABSTRACT. In this study, we are discussing the terms ‘idea’, ‘eidos’, and ‘logos’ in George Pachymeres’ *Paraphrase* of Dionysius the Areopagite’s *De divinis nominibus*. This is a very important topic, at least from the ontological point of view. Many questions come to the fore, such as whether the three terms are as to their meaning the same, whether their non-autonomous character is mentioned, what their relation with the divine energies is and whether and how they are connected to the divine will. The structure of our study is based on the fact that the terms come from the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Patristic tradition respectively. Considering that both God and the created beings are objective realities, which the human consciousness is asked to investigate, we attempt to extrapolate ontology to the gnoseological level as well. I.e. we attempt to explain the matter of ‘universals’ relying on two questions. Specifically, from the ontological point of view: do they exist independently? And, from the gnoseological point of view: what is their relation to the human thinking?

KEYWORDS: George Pachymeres, ideas, eide, logoi of beings, universals

Introduction

George Pachymeres (1242-1310) is one of the main representatives of the Palaiologian Renaissance in literature and the arts. He was a polymath personality with broad interests, which he approached in a synthetic light, oftentimes determined exclusively by specific theoretical goals. He dealt with quite a lot of sciences and kinds of knowledge and delivered an impressive work, founded with the requirements of a rigorous epistemology, both general and specialized; so we can also find in his thought valid suggestions of methodological examples. Moreover, the concepts used by him clearly represent the previous theoretical development. As a matter of fact, everything that was established since the beginning of the ninth century set methodology as a research criterion for validity and objectivity.

As to his work specifically, he was the first to include in the history that he wrote a detailed exposition of the dogmatic contradictions of his time; so, he also brought to the light the terms that they formed it. In this histori-

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ography, Pachymeres particularly insisted on the full description of the events, providing in this way the requirements for understanding the causal terms that bring to the light the research concerns. He was interested so much in presenting the truth that he tried to be as objective as he could, having in mind that this is something quite important for history, i.e. for the science of the human facts and choices. This choice of his could be included in the context of a scientific moderation, which actualizes a clear dialectic relation between intellectual developments and the external terms of the conditions.

He also composed an extensive synopsis of the Aristotelian philosophical system, choosing the right each time ways to present the texts, which in the catalogs of the manuscripts is entitled *Paraphrasis in universam philosophiam Aristotelis*. This text survives only in a Latin translation and includes several treatises on mathematical sciences. Whether he may be included in the Aristotelian tradition or not, we are of the opinion that he actually may, and not only because of the obvious references that he makes to Aristotle's works. All of his work shows the Aristotelian thought. And *Paraphrase*—very much like the Areopagite's works—means to offer a text for teaching purposes or as an answer that provides explanations to questions that have been already raised; these aspects of course are quite systematic. And speaking of systematicity, we do not only mean the obvious internal one but also the one that connects one issue to another and shows their succession.

This was another methodology he used while paraphrasing the Areopagite's works. And this attempt of his is one of the most typical cases of showing the combination between Christianity and Greek philosophy, especially the Neoplatonic one. In fact, in his *Paraphrase* of Dionysius the Areopagite's *De divinis nominibus* we find quite intensively an eclectic philosopher, who establishes a complete system of theogony and of ascribing attributes-names with explanations and foundation of its principles. We have to mention here that, while Maximus the Confessor's comments deal with some expressions quite critical for the Christian doctrine, Pachymeres, mainly in direct speech, presents the entire work of Dionysius, with an exciting as to its internal compositions encyclopedism.

He also knew thoroughly the Platonic ontology and cosmology, against which he kept a critical Christian attitude, especially when he commented an extensive part on Plato's treatise entitled *Parmenides* (Pachymeres 1989), the one that is actually included in the second hypothesis, from which he receives the preconditions in order to establish his affirmative theology. For example, we could mention his approaches on time, which philosophically and theologically are quite remarkable, since he finds similarities between Christianity and Platonism. In a similar way to which he paraphrased Dionysius the Areopagite's works, he also paraphrased the first book of the

mathematician Diophantus. From the epistemological point of view, also important may be considered his treatise on music or harmony.

His main, however, contribution lies on the fact that he established the philosophical and theological terms for the scientific, rational and clearly compatible with the principles of the Christian faith understanding of the sensible world, in the sense of a renewed theophany. He presented Christian God being the One who dynamically expresses its providence and continuously creates beautiful beings-things. So, given his abilities, he managed to provide a synthetic presentation of the past tradition and to show a non-static cosmological system, which requires the necessary changes of the scientific examples to take place, depending each time on a particular case. More specifically, following with precision the tradition, he made a distinction with rarely detailed limits between, on the one hand, human wisdom and science and, on the other hand, theology. He also pointed out that the latter should rely firstly and mostly on Christian thinkers' / the Church Fathers' works and secondly on scientific philosophical principles and evidence. He was quite interested in the Christian worldview and the normativity set by it and he was actually thinking of it as a historical-cultural construct. That is why he set accurate limits, and not only concerning the history, but also regarding the way in which the reasoning works, which was formed according to the principles of a long tradition, which he himself also represented. But even when he was choosing the second option, he was remaining theoretically consistent providing the necessary priorities into his texts.

This was a great contribution of his; that being clarified, one may say that he attempted to form a strict epistemology, under the criteria set by the Christian thought, which, despite the fact that it was self-formed, it was necessary to be supported with further additions in order to provide answers to new questions. In this way, he established a natural theology system, strictly limited against supernatural theology, which is considered the most authentic for the formation of the Christian worldview, which is extremely realistic. Of course, gnoseology sets also some demands and the more expanded the reality seemed, the more it caused for more mature research questions. Pachymeres starts from a basic Christian principle: that, despite that God creates the natural world and is the only cause for it, he does not emanate his essence, but only his energies, or more correctly, he emanates through what occurs from the infinite quantitatively combinations of them. According to this dominant position, which sets pantheism—and polytheism too—out of the question, the ontological and structural parallelisms between the created nature and God are excluded by definition.

That is why a special methodology is required to explain both what causality is and how it works. And here one may find the great achievement

both in Christianity and Neoplatonism: superlative theology, which is associated with unutterable conditions in which a human being works; this is a matter found also in other, historically similar, traditions of the Eastern Mediterranean world. However, we should not assume that superlative names are just an expanded self-confirmation of theology; they are furthermore an increasingly extensive maturation of self-knowledge and thing-knowledge on the part of the research subject. I.e. theology, except from the empirical experiential elements, takes into account rationality as well.

Focusing our attention on Pachymeres' *Paraphrase* of Dionysius the Areopagite's *De divinis nominibus*, a very important issue, at least from the ontological point of view, which emerges, is about the creative projection of the One-Good and results from the discussion about Plato's 'ideas' or Aristotle's 'eide'. The most important matter that we will discuss in this study is whether their non-self-existent/non-autonomous character is pointed out by the Byzantine thinker. The answer to this question will prove first of all a creation without preconditions and, consequently, the absolute ontological freedom of the supreme Principle from any external necessity. Furthermore, it will confirm, through the 'image of God' doctrine, the created beings' self-determination and will highlight the prospect of the 'likeness'. We will also attempt to approach the issue about 'logoi' of beings, which together with the 'ideas' and the 'eide' constitute what theoretically one could define as *universals*. In this early stage of our analysis, we should mention that the 'logoi' are the formatted cores from the combination of which the natural universe will arise. We will also pay special attention to whether the 'logoi' of beings differentiate from the divine energies. This is a very important distinction, since probably the 'logoi' appear to be the products of the divine energies. In this direction, we will explore whether Pachymeres speaks about combinations either between the divine energies or the 'logoi' of beings, so that the natural universe with its own specificities to arise. Finally, it is necessary to see whether the 'logoi' of beings are associated with volitional elements, i.e. whether they have a strictly ontological content or whether they simply mediate through their specificities for transferring the volitional character of the divine creation into the natural universe.

As for the structure of our study, we will follow this systematic way: we will discuss the matter of the archetypes in different chapters that will be formed according to the philosophical origin of every term and the way in which Pachymeres interprets them in his *Paraphrase*. So, we will first focus our attention on passages in which the Platonic 'idea' is found. Then, we will attempt to approach the Christian exegesis of the Aristotelian 'eidos'. Finally, we will show the way in which the 'logoi' of beings are explained, which refer to a patristic reading of the ancient Greek philosophy and, especially, of Neoplatonism. Bearing in mind that both God and his creatures

are objective realities, which the human consciousness is asked to study with the proper methodology, it becomes clear from the outset that we should extrapolate ontology in the gnoseological level as well. So, we believe that it is necessary to discuss the matter on *universals*, focusing our attention on two questions: ontologically speaking, do they have an autonomous existence; and, gnoseologically speaking, what is their relation with the human thinking?

A Brief Presentation of the Platonic Theory on 'Ideas' and the Aristotelian Theory on 'Eide': a Comparison

The main point of the Platonic theory on 'ideas' is the distinction between the world of being, which is eternal and unchanged, and the world of becoming, which is related to the development and includes the beings that are subject to the necessity caused by matter. Specifically, there is a distinction between, on the one hand, the real world and the paradigmatic metaphysical archetypes of every produced condition, which since they are ways in which the true beings appear have no will or energy and, on the other hand, the world of the images and the imitations of these archetypes. However, the produced beings, because of their similarity to their archetypes, participate in the way in which they exist. Or, in other words one may consider, on the one hand, *universals* as general substances and, on the other hand, the multitude of beings which fall under generation and corruption.

In Aristotle, 'eide', as synonyms of the Platonic 'ideas', are found in a potentially existing condition within matter and, axiologically speaking, they come before it. They are the models by which things gain their form. Despite this function of them and their unchanged ontological texture, they are not divided or separated from the matter. Therefore, no individual, separate, metaphysical existence is acknowledged for 'eide'. They may just form the non-formed. This is proved from the fact that they constitute the common property of many and different to each other beings. According to Aristotle, their ontological function is formative. This form is not found outside the sensible things, but exists in them as a tendency to perfection. I.e. form is a general principle that gives meaning and provides existence in the sensible world.

Exactly at this point, one may find the main difference between the Aristotelian and the Platonic theory: bearing in mind that Aristotle approaches the materialistic worldview, turns out that he sets the fact to be performed as more important than the Platonic 'idea'. Specifically, in Aristotle, the most important thing is the developing sensible forms, which do not constitute a second world, but together with the matter compose a single whole. The matter is both under the effect of the 'eidos' and the interdependent cosmic motions that come from the prime unmoved mover. By combining

the 'eidos' with the matter every essence arises, which may be approached and interpreted in two ways: it is either the essence of each thing or—from a realistic point of view—it is its own existence. On this basis, Aristotle shows that reality is by itself able to become sensible by receiving specific forms. In other words, he speaks about a materially sensible formation of the being, while his basic theory is that the world is a united and finite reality.

In Pachymeres both Platonism and Aristotelianism are found throughout the whole *Paraphrase of De divinis nominibus*. The Platonic aspect results from what is said about the reduction-ascent to God, who is the founder and the cause of every productive process. This is the theory on transcendence, which is required for the theory on immanence. The Aristotelian aspect comes to the fore mainly because of the insistence to the immanence. Particularly interesting is that Pachymeres attempts to combine these two aspects, without ever ignoring the intermediate Neoplatonic tradition, which has crucially influenced both the philosophical and the theological approaches-theories. We ought to mention that this kind of attempt, i.e. combining the Platonic and Aristotelian theories, is—after Antiochus of Ascalon—Neoplatonic. Actually, Plutarch, Syrianus, Proclus, and Damascius made quite a progress and provided impressive results. Especially in the Byzantine thought, this is a typical combination (Podskalsky 1977: 107-124, Benakis 2002: 249-258, 335-338, 359-387, 425-456), which also brings to the fore the discussion about 'logoi' of beings, the source of which is systematically found in Maximus the Confessor (Maximus the Confessor 1857: 332 A, Gersh 1978: 160). Admittedly, the concept 'logoi' was also used in the ancient Greek thought and that is why we may speak about a Christian transformation of the Neoplatonic terminology and about an inclusion of it in a different worldview.

Aspects of the Issue on 'Ideas' in George Pachymeres: the Christian Approach of Platonism

The combination of Platonism and Aristotelianism in George Pachymeres comes to the fore in the discussion about the divine goodness. As indicated, the good as a divine projection provides the form while, at the same time, preserves its transcendence. It is not separated either from the supreme Principle or from beings. As a volitionally provided divine energy, makes good and gives form to the created beings, without revealing or emanating the divine energy (Pachymeres 1857: 832 C, 852 A). This is the leading divine property that includes absolutely everything. On one condition: the provision is not subsequent, since otherwise there would be a deficiency in the original creation. In this context, the theory on archetypical 'ideas' arises, according to which, after some changes, the divine energies can be identified—not absolutely—with the 'ideas'. However, we need to pay attention

here: a divine energy, which is always good, as a 'procession' may also be considered an archetype, in the sense that it may have as a result in a specific way the rational formation of the natural universe.

Going deeper in the question on the divine goodness, G. Pachymeres brings more dynamically to the fore the issue of the 'ideas' while specifically discussing the principles in which the process of the creation works. In his opinion, God is a paradigmatic, final, creative and material principle (Pachymeres 1857: 769 B-C, Maximus the Confessor 1857: 260 C). Focusing our attention on the paradigmatic principles, we would say that in Pachymeres' view the product comes into existence according to them. Their meaning is creative and multiplicative, since they come out of their pure condition. So, a paradigmatic principle is equivalent to the 'idea', which, as the Christian philosopher explains, is an independent and eternal thought of the eternal God (Pachymeres 1857: 769B-C, 860 C, 861 A, 861 B, 888 B). Platonism here is quite obvious; actually, we speak about its historical phase from Antiochus of Ascalon and thence, by whom, as well as the subsequent discussions, middle Platonism is clearly inspired. Certainly, Pachymeres' Christian approach on 'ideas' does not suggest at this point a specific standard according to which God actually thought and acted. Such a view would result in a necessity, in the sense that it would set unconditional requirements, which should have been available for God while creating the world and he would necessarily have to take account of them. In other words, God's self-activation—freedom would no longer exist and that is why we would end up to a divine will which is forced and limited by the external data. Finally, there would be implicitly a superior than God or equivalent to him 'idea', so the result would be to accept that there are two or more principles and causes. The consequences of such a view would be basically two: (a) A Neoplatonic multi-causality would be introduced and (b) a supreme Principle would be continuously searched for.

With the intention to make clearer the distinction between God, who ontologically and axiologically comes first, and the following 'ideas'—as well as the paradigms, which are the projections of the 'ideas'—Pachymeres expresses his opposition to the view of the ancient philosophers, who say that the 'ideas' are enhypostatic within beings (Pachymeres 1857: 849 C-D). We must mention here that is not clear whether he refers to Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism or Neoplatonism. The most likely is that he refers to Aristotelianism and Stoicism. Moreover, regarding the meaning of 'enhypostatic', we should say that this is a term frequently found in Christian texts, for instance in Leontius Byzantinus. Pachymeres' main purpose is not to allow any external ontological preconditions to relate with the creative fact and to highlight the absolute autonomy and the free will of the supreme Principle. So, in his view, if the 'ideas' did not exist in a simple and uniform way as the

absolutely hyper-extended thoughts of the absolutely hyper-extended and absolutely united God, this state of theirs would mean that God is composite and that he consists of, first, the 'idea'-paradigm and, secondly, himself. This kind of view would confirm an ontological duality. Therefore, to exclude this possibility, every ontological condition should be assigned to the supreme Principle; this is an issue that also relates to the Christian approach of the first two hypotheses of the Platonic *Parmenides* (Gersh 153-165; Corsini 77-165). Thus, in Pachymeres, union exceeds anything that already exists or will exist and every creative action should be assigned only to God. Now, the matter of God's hyper-simplicity comes to the fore, which gathers to itself everything in a pre-determining way (Pachymeres 1857: 849 D). I.e. the 'procession' and the production of beings start exclusively from the good activation of the divine energy, which is not subject to any precondition.

G. Pachymeres is also close to Platonic 'ideas' in his remarks about time and its relation to eternity, which is considered the archetypical 'idea' of time, or, in other words, the incorruptible state of a finite measure (Pachymeres 1857: 837 A-B). Of particular interest is, however, that God is considered to be himself the eternity. He is the entity that has no beginning and no end, but constantly *is*. He is the archetype of the created world (Pachymeres 1857: 853 B). Furthermore, thinking in a Christian way, the sensible world is subject to the corruption and its complete annihilation is not prevented because of the extra-cosmic 'ideas', which are self-constituted—according to the Platonic example—and independent from the ontological reality of the Demiurge, but is assigned to the Demiurge, who is not subject to any necessity and acts in an absolutely free way (Pachymeres 1857: 837 D). The *ex nihilo* creation doctrine comes again to the fore and eliminates the possibility 'ideas' to work as requirements in God's action. Therefore, any reference made—either explicit or implicit—on the Platonic 'ideas', in Pachymeres shows the unchanging quality, the immutability and the regulatory role of God, who absolutely determines the ontology of the entire created world.

Aspects of the Issue on 'Eide' in George Pachymeres: the Christian Approach of Aristotelianism

The question on 'potentiality', which refers to the created beings, shows the Aristotelian orientation of George Pachymeres. And speaking about created beings, here we mean knowable beings, which are totally subject to God, even before their creation (Pachymeres 1857: 836 C-D). Specifically, according to the Christian thinker, God, since he is a paradigmatic cause, possesses in himself all the substances of beings that existed, exist and will exist (Pachymeres 1857: 764 B, 885 B-C). I.e. in contrast to the potentially exist-

ing beings, God exists in actuality. And speaking about existing 'in actuality' in a strict Christian context, as it is Pachymeres', we mean the ontological factor that fits in God who is considered to be the self-founding power, which acts in a 'processional' way for the production of all the creatures (Gersh 27-49; 204-217). In short, in Pachymeres the potentially existing leads to a development and development is not possible to be found in the transcendent plane of God. We have to mention that the divine 'procession' is not a development. It is considered to be an exit from the status of 'remaining' and an internal—kat' oekonomia—development.

The discussion about the states of 'potentially existing' and 'actually existing' makes us to examine the Christian interpretation of the Aristotelian term 'eidos'. This is a term that requires special attention, since, when it works as a paradigmatic concept, i.e. as an archetype, it is not clear what the differences from the usage of the Platonic 'idea' or Maximus the Confessor's 'logoi' of beings are. In order to understand the meaning of it, we have to approach first the different meanings in which the term is presented in Pachymeres' *Paraphrase*.

So, 'eidos' as a cosmological concept means the sensible form that the changeable matter can receive. Under this view, something unspecified becomes definable, while matter is the substrate, which gets its specific form and becomes a certain being, when it accepts the intervention of the 'eidos' (Pachymeres 1857: 748 A). So, it is clear that the intervention of the 'eidos' gives in each case a specific content. However, if a being has no 'eidos', it disappears, it becomes *aneideo*, i.e. without 'eidos'. This is corruption, since it moves towards non-being. The Platonic influence here is quite obvious, but with one difference: in Christianity, the monistic example is dominant, while in Plato we find a dualism. We need to clarify, however, that the way in which Pachymeres presents the intervention of the 'eidos' into matter is strictly technical, since in the Christian worldview matter appears together with its 'eidos'. And this is the point where we find the Aristotelian theory, to which there is a clear reference in the *Paraphrase* (Pachymeres 1857: 805 C). As a general conclusion, we may say that matter gradually displays its countless forms according to a developmental planning. This development has nothing to do with the One-Good, since it represents only the kinetic presence of matter, during in fact its continuous active development.

The above perspective leads to the interpretation of 'eidos' in the sense of an ontological concept. Thus, the 'eidos' may indicate a certain category or a particular nature and, consequently, describes an individual being created by God. For instance, in the discussion about angels Pachymeres says that the being itself, which is an 'eidos' of life, through which angels acquire their essence, life and intellect, is considered to be matter (Pachymeres 1857: 840 A). We have to mention that in the case of angels, matter is not

identified with the corruptible matter of the sensible beings. Matter here is the act of creation by a supreme Principle, to which angels are entirely subject. So, when we say that angels are immaterial, we do not just mean that they are not sensibly conceivable, but also that they are pure energies.

The 'eidos' may also have a henological meaning. Note here that when a concept is included in the category of Henology, refers to the completely unanticipated nature of the supreme Principle and to the fact that this is the only requirement for the existence of the rest of the beings and of the constitution of the reasoning—mainly the negative one—about God. Pay however attention to this: despite the negative expression, the resulting metaphysics remains firmly onto-theological, in the sense that the objectivity of God's manifestations is not disputed at all. Furthermore, God is a personal being regarding both his triadic relations and his communication with the creation (Pachymeres 1857: 836 C, 840 C). Thus, according to Pachymeres God is the 'eidos' of the things without 'eidos', he is the creator and the principle of every 'eidos' but he is without 'eidos' compared with the beings that have received a form (Pachymeres 1857: 673 C). At this point, the apophatic theology arises to declare that God is the essence which is above any created substance (Lossky 1973: 25, Roques 1957: 99). In personal terms, he is 'ὁ ὄν', the above-being being and the self-founding hypostatic cause of being according to the power of its ontological texture. And coming back to the question on the potentially existing and the actually existing, God has created or will continue to create all the beings, so we speak about a divine active causality, which comes exclusively from the supreme Principle and has no beginning and no end. In general, there is a clear combination of the One's transcendence and productivity. So, there is a developmental type transition and a permanent distinction between the essence and the energy. In this context, the terms do not exclude one another.

The most important, however, meaning of the 'eidos' in Pachymeres' *Paraphrase* is the paradigmatic one. In this case, 'eidos' is placed together with the creative 'logoi' of beings. What needs consideration is that there is no explanation about what the exact difference between 'eide' and 'logoi' of beings is (Pachymeres 1857: 844 A-B). Hypothetically speaking, we could suggest that the 'eide' result from the combinations of the 'logoi' and, in this way, the paradigmatic cause is prolifically combined with the archetypical paradigm, which is a general 'eidos' projected in many ways in the sensible world. The 'logoi' or the 'eide', however, are not able to function autonomously against the supreme Principle, since they are not self-constituted, but they are included into God who is the Creator. And exactly at this point one may identify in Christian thought the Aristotelian 'eide' with the Platonic 'Ideas'. As for what the similarity between the 'eide' and the 'logoi' is, in a wide perspective, we could say that they are identified-inhere to some ex-

tent within God in a united way and that their most important ascertainable difference is found into the natural universe. In this sense, the 'eide' are considered to be the productive archetypes, which, although being distinct, inhere as 'logoi' of beings that are to be manifested-applied in God's thought in complete unity, function paradigmatically and 'feed' the process of the emergence and development of the sensible world. Thus, the 'eide' are the creative causes of the created beings and are gathered together as the creative 'logoi' within the productive way in which God exists and is projected. So, the created beings are directly created by the 'logoi'; therefore, their metaphysical eidetic content lies in themselves (Pachymeres 1857: 841 C-844 B). Either way, the divine reality establishes all the creative requirements by its extended immanence, which is actually shown in many ways.

**Aspects of the Issue on 'Logoi' of Beings in George Pachymeres:
the Patristic Approach of the Ancient Greek Philosophy**

In the fourth chapter of his *Paraphrase* (Pachymeres 1857: 801 C-D), Pachymeres introduces the idea of a stable model for the creation of the natural universe. This is the 'logoi' of beings. We have to pay, however, special attention at this point. When we speak about the creation in Christianity, we mean a process of production of both intangible and material entities, which from the patristic point of view and according to the Byzantine texts, is far from, on the one hand, Platonism, according to which matter and the 'ideas' function independently from the Creator who creates using already existing elements and, on the other, Aristotelianism, which also sets requirements in the sense, however, of Hylomorphism. This is quite important remark, since in Pachymeres the 'logoi' of beings, as a paradigmatic concept, refers to archetypes. These archetypes, however, are not independent beings, i.e. they do not own metaphysical ontological hypostasis in the sense that they are distinct or individually existent. Furthermore, they are not considered to be the requirements in which the Creator's productive externalizations would be set in action.

Specifically, according to Pachymeres, the 'logoi' of beings exist within God without beginning and in a united way (Pachymeres 1857: 932 B-C), before any productive or archetypal externalization of theirs (Terezis 2004: 133; Brons 1976: 154). They are not self-determined, but are simply the divine wills during their projection. In this sense, the 'logoi' are the way in which the providential divine will is manifested, which is revealed only because of the divine goodness (Pachymeres 1857: 852 C). In other words, the 'logoi' of beings not only do not exist in an independent way, but also work as intermediates for the transfer of the volitional character of the divine creation into the natural universe (Pachymeres 1857: 848 C-D). Re-

garding whether the paradigms of all the beings pre-exist into God, Pachymeres says that these 'logoi' are the providences, the bestowments, the motions, so, in this sense, the 'logoi' are identical to the energies, not absolutely but as to their projected-formed states. The most important is that the divine 'logoi' are inferior to the divine energies.

Relying on the above, one could argue that the 'logoi' are clearly ontologically defined by God as somehow cores with clear and eternal ontological possibilities. In order to understand this, we have to keep in mind that for Pachymeres the created world was created by God's absolutely free will and ex nihilo. So, any chance the sensible world to pre-exist and, consequently, to exist since ever, even just within the divine thought, is totally out of the question. This is an issue that is explained in a quite impressive way by Maximus the Confessor, who makes a distinction between the 'volition' and the 'existence', or, in other words, between the 'will' and the 'actualization of the will' (Maximus the Confessor 1865: 293D-296 D). Specifically, the pre-eternal will does not mean an automatic creation too. This is a very important remark, so that any necessity, which could relate to a mandatory extension of the pre-eternity of the divine volition, to be excluded. Otherwise, the world would be considered eternal, since this specific volition by which it is produced would be pre-eternal. On this basis, finally a clear distinction between the divine thought, the divine will and the actualization of the divine will arises. It seems that Pachymeres, as a consistent Christian thinker, adopts this distinction by naming the 'logoi' as 'productive divine wills', a term which, on the one hand, differentiates the action from the will and, on the other hand, shows their successful, developmentally speaking, combinations, so that the formed universe should actually come into existence (Pachymeres 1857: 848 B-C).

At this point, we could also discuss the term Logos, which in Eastern Christianity is identical to the supreme Principle and, thus, it is completely placed into the area of the uncreated. Parenthetically, we have to mention that the Logos might mean Cause-of-everything, Logic and Speech. The leading, however, meaning is that the Logos is the constitutive and cohesive power, the primary cause, the 'reverting'—and consciously actualized—end of the created beings (Pachymeres 1857: 852 D-853 A). Quite important here is to understand the creation 'in the Logos' and 'by the Logos' or, as Pachymeres says, *'everything was created by him, from him, and in him'* (Pachymeres 1857: 853 C). These are wordings that implicitly refer to the triadic relations and in the case discussed to the relation between Father-Son. In this sense of the projection, the pre-eternal volition is actualized here too willingly, i.e. it is the result of a free connection. This is a view that is clearly different from an actually necessary extension of divine thought.

Being more specific, God's thoughts become the 'logoi' of beings, not only as thoughts, but also as volitions. So, the 'logoi' of beings are identical to the volitions as projections. Volitions are not subject to any necessity and are identical to the primary causes of the created beings (Pachymeres 1857: 849 A). Furthermore, the world as the result of God's creative action is actually the product of the divine will, or, in other words, of the divine energies. This view proves the absolute divine freedom too. Therefore, all the creatures of the natural world are considered created beings, since they have been created by God. They are created but they were always existed into Him as 'logoi' of beings, not, however, in the sense of a complete co-eternity. On this basis, the act of creation means the actualization of the divine will, which of course is co-eternal with the essence. So, the 'logoi' of beings are the manifestations of the Logos as the results of his energies and powers and, consequently, all the created world is a kind of embodiments of the Logos, provided that the 'logoi' of beings indicate the uncreated creative causes of beings, or, in other words, the natural 'logoi' are the products of the uncreated divine 'logoi' (Pachymeres 1857: 848 D-849 A). This is an approach which in Pachymeres appears quite clearly, especially as regards its general principles. We should mention here that the individual 'logoi' reduce to universal 'logoi' and all together are gathered to the Logos, who is the supreme Principle and the point to which everything returns, according to the original planning (Pachymeres 1857: 833 D-836 A, 836 A-C). For the opposite motion, one should see the discussion about angels in the fourth chapter of the *Paraphrase* (Pachymeres 1857: 748 C), where the following is explained: 'Διὸ νοοῦνται μὲν ὡς ἄυλοι, νοοῦσι δὲ τὰ ὄντα, ὡς νόες ἀσώματοι καὶ ὑπερκόσμοι, ἄνωθεν ἐλλαμτομένοι τοὺς περὶ τῶν ὄντων τῶν λόγους, καὶ διαβιβάζοντες αὐτοὺς μυστικῶς εἰς τοὺς ὑποβεβηκότας ἀγγέλους.' We have to mention that here one may also see the cognitive function of the 'logoi'.

Through the relation between the 'logoi' of beings and triune God's creative volition the inconceivable relation between the created beings and the uncreated God is proved, which accordingly reveals God's internal unity, permanence and coherence. By accepting this theory, we actually reject any version of diarchy or automatism, since the world, on the one hand, is subject to the divine reality and, on the other hand, is a continually moving under development organic whole. Its main elements are the 'logoi' of beings, which compose its theoretical part, and the laws of nature, which define the action that takes place. Both the concepts of dependence and freedom come quite intensively to the fore. Thus, the world turns out to be the proof of a supreme being that works as a supreme Principle, while the internal structure of every being becomes consistent with the pre-eternal will for the creation of the world. We have to mention that the 'logoi', since they

are gathered together in an unconfused way in order the creative nature of the universe to emerge, they are combined, so that the natural universe and its specificities to come into existence and to function properly (Pachymeres 1857: 840 A, 844 A-B). We should, however, pay attention to this: under no circumstances should we think that in Pachymeres there is a mechanistic naturalistic subjection of the created beings, since the relation between God and the created beings does not leave any space for such a possibility. I.e. this is a special kind of dependence, a personal one that establishes freedom.

In fact, the divine universal structure is emphasized, which, however, is differentiated according to each being's receptivity. Based on this view, the knowledge of the 'logoi' of beings leads to the knowledge of the divine will, which is found to be corporeal in the 'logos' of each being. Thus, we may say that gnoseology meets ontology, since the relation by grace—and clearly not the substantial one—between God and his creatures, in the light of the 'logoi' of beings, becomes the source of the knowledge of the divine will. Consequently, the 'logoi' of beings as being-producing terms of the creation are the determining factors of the constitution of the created world and that is why they are called 'paradigms' and 'pre-determinations' (Pachymeres 1857: 848 B). Clearly, they do not have autonomy or independence in the archetypical sense that they have in Plato. Note also that the 'logoi' of beings not only relate to the personal beings, but, also refer and relate to all the creatures, from the inferior to the superior ones (Pachymeres 1857: 833 A).

Thus, both the rational and the irrational realm possess a coherent constitution; this is a structural parameter that indicates the dynamic connection between the divine world and the created world, which might be change only after the dissolving intervention of a personal being to the impersonal nature. Furthermore, even the entirely rational beings do not participate to the divine energies in themselves but to their projections; this is a version which shows once again that the divine energies are seen as superior to the 'logoi'. Otherwise, i.e. if there was a direct participation, we would be speaking about an exceedance of the ontological boundaries and an inherency of the beings within what God is, even as energy. For instance, the self-being is the creative and the paradigmatic 'logos' of being (Pachymeres 1857: 832 A-853 C), the self-life is the creative and the paradigmatic 'logos' of life (Pachymeres 1857: 860 A-865 A), and the self-intellect is the creative and the paradigmatic 'logos' of intellect (Pachymeres 1857: 877 A-889 A).

The concepts with the 'self-' prefix refer to archetypes and clearly connect to the metaphysics of immanence, without however never to negate the divine transcendence. I.e. they show that the unparticipated supreme reality becomes participated because of the divine energies, which with the 'self-' prefix are presented before any manifestation, as things in themselves. I.e.

they are the properties that we find into the creation. Note that only the supreme Principle possesses them in an absolute degree (Pachymeres 1857: 840 A-841 B).

Aspects of the Issue on Universals in George Pachymeres

Considering all the above, it becomes necessary to study the position of *universals* in the *Paraphrase of De divinis nominibus*. George Pachymeres here is clearly thinking according to a moderate Conceptual Realism. He rejects a pre-existence of the 'ideas' in the sense of a requirement for the creation of the beings and suggests the inseparability of the divine unity, within which the created world is gathered in a united and seminal way. Thus, for the Byzantine thinker, universals are found: (1) *before the multitude (universalia ante res)*, as creative divine 'logoi', i.e. as God's simple thoughts, which however are found all over the natural world as expressions of his power. This is a point of view that highlights the creative function of the 'ideas' and is related to a rather Platonic reading (Pachymeres 1857: 848 B-C). (2) *Within the multitude (universalia in rebus)*, a term in which the particularity of the beings in relation to the wholeness arises, with the concepts of 'genus' and 'species' to combine in a successful way. This is an approach found in the Aristotelian theory on the first substance. (3) *After the multitude (universalia post res)*, a term which is not only related to the '*post res*' of the nominalists, but also relates to Aristotle's theory on the second substance, a posteriori and by abstraction into human being's mind. So, the knowledge of the genera and the species brings also to the fore what emerges into the human consciousness with concepts (Pachymeres 1957: 833 C, 840 A-841 B, 844 A-B, 844 C-848 D, 848 D-852 A, 852 D-853 A, 853 C, 989 B-D).

Therefore, for Pachymeres *Universals* are not considered to be just separated, like the—ante res—Platonic 'ideas'; they are not considered to be exclusively unseparated from the beings, like the—in rebus—Aristotelian 'eide'; they are considered to be separated in the souls, since they are formed a posteriori, and unseparated from things (Benakis 1978-79: 311-340). I.e. for Pachymeres, *universals* are (1) the logoi and the causes of the things, (2) immanent in the sensible beings, and (3) the knowledge of the genera and species or, in other words, the cognitive approach of the general entities. From this point of view, every individual thing is a special expression-appearance of the *universal*, which is deemed that possesses unchangeable properties, which do not depend on the amount that the universal is received. It is remarkable the fact that the Byzantine thinker excludes from the outset an absolute—but not relevant—nominalist approach and considers to be actually true its relation with all the individual beings. This is an approach that, together with the theory on archetypes, not only combines realism and nominalism, but also describes the way in which the transition

from Henology to Cosmology is accomplished (Pachymeres 1857: 832 A, 836 C-837 D). And by extending this thought, the above mentioned 'logoi' of beings, which derive from the divine energies, come in close connection with the corporeal conditions; this approach shows more clearly Pachymeres moderate Conceptual Realism (Pachymeres 1857: 844 C).

Conclusions

Two are the systematic directions, which are clearly interesting from the historical point of view too, in which this study was elaborated: (1) the relationship between Theology and Philosophy in Byzantium and, more specifically, in the late Palaiologian Renaissance, when the terms of the debate among different theoretical systems was not under construction, but both the similarities and the differences were quite clear, and (2) the influence of the Neoplatonic—and indirectly of the Platonic and Aristotelian—theory on Pachymeres' *Paraphrase* of Dionysius the Areopagite's *De divinis nominibus*, a treatise which is one of the most typical examples of the connection between Christianity and Neoplatonism.

The method that we followed was determined by Pachymeres' special personality. Two are the facts that guided our reasoning: (1) the fact that the *Paraphrase* is an extension of a period of major importance, which may be described as Byzantine humanism and which had reestablished the significance of the ancient Greek thought regarding the formation not only of the human mind, but also in general of the human existence, and (2) the fact that Pachymeres has an excellent knowledge of the Platonic, Aristotelian and Neoplatonic thought. So, our attempt was determined by the requirements set by the definition of the similarities and the differences between what he was traditionally representing and what theoretically influenced him, by consequence, between two different worldviews, Christianity and Neoplatonism. One must never ignore the fact that Pachymeres was a Christian man and that he was following a strictly defined worldview. Thus, in any analysis we made regarding what the meaning of the concepts is and how they are used, i.e. what is the actual theoretical framework in which Pachymeres includes them, what the chosen research perspective of his is and which are the objections raised by him, we found that he was following all the time the main principles of Christianity, which worked as preconditions for his arguments, despite the fact that he utilized all the concepts of the ancient Greek philosophy. I.e. we realized that Greek philosophy was just a useful tool which helped him achieve his goals and that the concepts 'Idea', 'eidos', and 'logoi of beings' do not keep their original meaning, but fall under the purposes set by the ideological area in which they are placed. We chose to examine the terms separately, in order to focus our attention firstly on the Christian transformations of the Platonic and the Aristotelian

theory and secondly on the Patristic reading of the ancient Greek philosophy. Therefore, regarding specifically the three concepts, we came to the following conclusions.

First, all of them may be considered paradigmatic, since they are related to archetypes.

Second, regarding specifically the 'ideas': they exist in a simple and uniform way as the absolutely hyper-extended thoughts of the absolutely hyper-extended and absolutely united God. They show the stability, the immutability and the regulatory role that God holds, who absolutely determines the ontology of the created world.

Third, regarding specifically the 'eidos': this term has a lot of meanings and appears often together with the 'logoi', without, however, the difference between the two concepts to be clear. Hypothetically speaking, we could suggest that the 'eide' result from the combinations of the 'logoi' and show the paradigmatic cause in an archetypical way. Either way, through the words used, Pachymeres presents the 'processional' activation of God, who is the Cause and the Creator of the entire created world.

Fourth, regarding the 'logoi' of beings: they also show the 'processional' function of God as creator of the entire created world. Since God includes in him the 'logoi'—together with the 'eide'—any suggestion about an independent existence of them is totally rejected. Thus, the 'logoi' of beings are not self-existent causes; they are the 'pre-existent logoi', which contribute to the formation process of the divine planning, so that the created world with its particular beings to come into existence. Furthermore, we may consider 'logoi' to be the providences and the bestowments, which show the way in which the divine energies function in relation with the way in which they manifest.

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